Being an absolute economic superpower (by 1992 producing 26 percent of the world's gross product and controlling around a half patents in force), the United States performed a super-friendly and an extremely decent economic policy vis-à-vis all potential rivals.
It supported the economic reforms in Russia in the early 1990s, it bailed out Mexico from its debt crisis in 1994, it refrained from introducing any restrictions on the cheap Asian imports after the 1997–1998 financial crisis, and advocated the acceptance of China to the World Trade Organization on conditions designed rather for a mid-sized developing economy rather than for a rising industrial powerhouse.
S.-based companies—Apple and Google are clear leaders with 75 percent. As of March 2017, all the top ten companies by market capitalization were once again American—for the first time ever since the 1970s!
I believe that, these days, purely financial achievement shouldn’t be overestimated: as of April, 2019, both mainland China and Hong Kong hold around $1.33 trillion in U. Treasuries—but if they try to sell them off no “financial tsunami” will arise since U. banks can easily buy them out and get loans from the Federal Reserve using Treasuries as a perfect collateral: one may remember that between 20 the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet grew by $2.1 trillion, so the same can well be repeated if China engages in a full-scale financial confrontation.
I don’t want to go into the details of his argument, but his major idea was that, since the authoritarian communist regimes and the planned economies were crumbling around the world, liberal democracy and market economy will prevail in a manner which excludes the major conflicts common for centuries—and therefore the traditional “history” terminates.
In the years that passed since the essay went out, dozens of scholars have dedicated their time and efforts in denouncing Fukuyama’s thesis by arguing that history is alive and well, while those who think another way are simply “dreamers.” Of course, there is some evidence these days that not every trend supports the idea that history has ended—but I would say that outside of the political dimension, there was another one which firmly stood for quite a long time behind Fukuyama’s proposition.Both parts of the world’s economy became well dependent on each other, and in this new order there were no reasons for economic wars and quarrels.If one remembers the economic history of both the 1990s and 2000s, then one will find few cases of rivalry.If one looks on the global economy, then one should admit it has changed from 1989 to 2019 much more than global politics has.While the political rivalry actually never disappeared entirely, and nations like Russia never became liberal democracies, the “end of economic history” could be easily recorded.As of early 2019, more than half of all desktop or notebook computers in the world were produced in China, but the country can furnish with locally made microchips less than one-third of this number, therefore remaining highly dependent on imports while up to 60 percent of all global manufacturers rely on Intel microchips.In server processors, the Intel domination is much larger—98 percent.It seemed that the resurging industrial world successively challenged the post-industrial one, and the final outcome of this epic combat was far from predetermined.But all these numbers that formally confirm that the gap between the leader and the follow-ups has dramatically been bridged do not reflect the whole situation in the global economy—and if one looks at the United States’ technological dominance, one recognizes that it’s as remarkable as it was a quarter of a century ago.Selling its software, the Western powers didn’t sell the knowledge embodied in the original program, they sold just the copies which could be reproduced in any additional quantity at zero cost.At the same time, the newly emerged economies in Asia used the American technologies to create the sophisticated hardware producing these goods in increasing amounts therefore establishing themselves as “ultimate industrial societies.” This new configuration was perfectly post-historical in Fukuyama’s sense.
Comments Francis Fukuyama Thesis
The End of History and the Last Man The Free Press; 1992
Fukuyama's contemporary consideration of this ultimate question is both a fascinating education in the philosophy of history and a thought-provoking inquiry into the deepest issues of human society and destiny. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA is a former deputy director of the U. S. State Department's Policy Planning Staff. He is currently a resident…
Francis Fukuyama Critical Essays -
Francis Fukuyama 1952-. Fukuyama's essay, revised and expanded in The End of History and the Last Man 1992, attracted an outpouring of critical commentary and debate in both academic and mainstream media circles. In subsequent works, Trust 1995 and The Great Disruption 1999, he similarly attempted to elucidate and anticipate.…
Francis Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’ Was Misunderstood by.
Francis Fukuyama in 2008 Larry Downing/Reuters He recognized the enduring role of religion and fretted over the persistence of nationalism, but he underestimated both. ‘What we may be.…
A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF FUKUYAMA'S THESIS THE END OF HISTORY?
Of law Fukuyama. also makes reference s to Kojeve, who is a modern French in terpreter of Hegel. For Kojeve, this so-called 'universal homogenou states is' re alized in the countries of post-war Western Europe.5 3 Fukuyama, Francis, "Th History?"e En,d The of National interest, Summer89 4 Fukuyama, Francis, "The End of History?" 5 Ibid.…
The End of History and the Last Man - Wikipedia
Fukuyama has also stated that his thesis was incomplete, but for a different reason "there can be no end of history without an end of modern natural science and technology" quoted from Our Posthuman Future. Fukuyama predicts that humanity's control of its own evolution will have a great and possibly terrible effect on liberal democracy.…
The End of History. Francis Fukuyama 1992
The fifth and final part of this book addresses the question of the “end of history,” and the creature who emerges at the end, the “last man.” In the course of the original debate over the National Interest article, many people assumed that the possibility of the end of history revolved around the question of whether there were viable alternatives to liberal democracy visible in the world today.…
Francis Fukuyama - Wikipedia
Francis Fukuyama. Before that, he served as a professor and director of the International Development program at the School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University. Previously, he was Omer L. and Nancy Hirst Professor of Public Policy at the School of Public Policy at George Mason University.…
Francis Fukuyama's thesis, "the End of History"
Francis Fukuyama writes an article and a book arguing that the end of the Cold War is just a sign for the end of human growth in history. Fukuyama’s thesis has three main elements that he argues; an empirical argument, philosophical argument and then a variety of reasons.…