States commonly implement counter measures in the wake of such attacks, or invoke these attacks to justify such measures.
However, these laws typically encompass activities, groups, and individuals that are non violent, or where the violence is not the outrageous bombings and the like popularly associated with terrorism.
The contemporary counter terrorism experience reflects a long and intimate relationship between counter terrorism and state crime.
After the military regime in Argentina was ousted in 1983, a commission of inquiry concluded that the terrorism of the military regime was infinitely worse than the terror they were allegedly combating (Herman 1993).
During the past decade, counter terrorism in the war on terror has been linked to state crimes including crimes of aggression, (Kramer and Michalowski 2005), torture (Danner 2004), police crime (Mc Culloch and Sentas 2006) corruption, and state corporate crime (Whyte 2007).
States argue that in the face of the exceptional threat of terrorism it is necessary to breach fundamental human rights and sometimes to undertake preemptive military action.
Complacency over state violence is not justified by the history of counter terrorism.
States, through the military, police, and intelligence and security services have enormous capacity to coerce and inflict violence.
Intelligence is gathered and interpreted through undisclosed assumptions, ideological predispositions, racial prejudice and intersecting vested interests linked to partisan politics, corporate priorities, and foreign policy.
The Chairman of the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, for example, concluded in a 2008 statement about the invasion of Iraq that, In making the case for war, the administration, repeatedly presented intelligence as fact when it was unsubstantiated, contradicted or even nonexistent (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 2008).